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Abstract—Autonomous robots need to be able to adapt to
unforeseen situations and to acquire new skills through trial
and error. Reinforcement learning in principle offers a suitable
methodological framework for this kind of autonomous learning.
However current computational reinforcement learning agents
mostly learn each individual skill entirely from scratch. How
can we enable artificial agents, such as robots, to acquire some
form of generic knowledge, which they could leverage for the
learning of new skills? This paper argues that, like the brain,
the cognitive system of artificial agents has to develop a world
model to support adaptive behavior and learning. Inspiration
is taken from two recent developments in the cognitive science
literature: predictive processing theories of cognition, and the
sensorimotor contingencies theory of perception. Based on these,
a hypothesis is formulated about what the content of information
might be that is encoded in an internal world model, and how
an agent could autonomously acquire it. A computational model
is described to formalize this hypothesis, and is evaluated in a
series of simulation experiments.
Index Terms—Latent states, model learning, sensorimotor
contingencies theory, predictive processing, context, spectral clus-
tering.
I. INTRODUCTION
AUTONOMOUS robots need to be able to adapt tounforeseen situations and to acquire new skills through
trial and error. Reinforcement learning in principle offers
a suitable methodological framework for this kind of au-
tonomous learning [1]. However there is undoubtedly still
a significant difference between the learning performance of
current computational reinforcement learning agents and that
of their biological counterparts (humans and other animals):
the latter can readily make use of a huge amount of generic
knowledge, which they have accumulated over the whole
history of their past experience, allowing them to quickly
come up with strategies to solve novel tasks, whereas current
computational reinforcement leaning agents mostly learn each
individual skill entirely from scratch. How can we endow
artificial agents, such as robots, with the capability to acquire
some form of generic knowledge, which they could leverage
for the learning of new skills?
This paper argues that the difference in learning perfor-
mance is largely due to the lack of a generic model-acquisition
mechanism in artificial systems, and offers a perspective on the
topic, which is taking inspiration from recent developments in
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the cognitive science literature. In particular, this work is mo-
tivated by “predictive processing (PP)” theories of cognition
[2]–[5], according to which a fundamental principle behind
the functioning of the brain is the continuous minimization
of prediction errors, or equivalently “free energy” [3]. As a
consequence of this drive, so it is argued by the theories, the
brain acquires a hierarchical model that estimates the latent
causes of observable events. PP has been well received by the
recent cognitive science literature and related disciplines as
a candidate brain theory [6]. However, it describes cognitive
processing on a rather high level of abstraction and leaves most
“implementation details” open for interpretation. In particular,
PP does not provide a clear account for how the latent causes
of observable events could be learned by an agent without
any form of prior knowledge, and to what extent an agent
should try to estimate latent causes – an agent can certainly
not learn everything, but has to focus on what is relevant for
its behavior.
It has recently been proposed [5], [7], [8] that PP lends itself
naturally to be combined with the so called “sensorimotor
contingencies theory (SMCT)” of perception [9], which might
shed some light on aspects of PP that are underspecified. In
tandem, PP and SMCT can offer a more concrete hypothesis
about what could be the basic units of knowledge in the brain:
predictive models that capture information about how certain
sensory input signals change in a particular way, in response to
own actions. Importantly, these predictive models are generic,
as their acquisition and functioning does not depend on a
certain task or modality. Furthermore they are contextual: their
outputs are only correct in certain contexts (or “contingencies”,
in the language of the SMCT). Said otherwise, they only
predict well as long as some external situation is in place.
A simple example is that of object perception: A good
predictive model capturing information about what an object
looks like could produce accurate predictions for the visual
input when the agent is looking at the object, and how
this input will change when the object is moved. But the
predictions of this model would only be correct as long as the
object is actually present. When the object is replaced with a
different one, the model would of course no longer be able to
make accurate predictions. The model itself can thus be seen
as an active component in the cognitive system of the agent It
corresponds to a hypothesis of the cognitive system about an
environmental circumstance: it captures the hypothesis that a
certain object is present, or in the general case, the hypothesis
of what could be called a “sensorimotor context” (cf. also the
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2model presented in [10], one of the early precursors of the
predictive processing hypothesis).
In this paper, these ideas will be further developed, and
importantly, it will be explored how a naive agent with no
prior experience can autonomously learn the hypothesized
basic units of knowledge. A computational model will be
presented to demonstrate and evaluate the ideas developed in
this paper. It treats the experiences of an agent as transitions in
a graph of sensorimotor states. Candidate models are densely
connected subgraphs within this graph. It will be explained,
how this computational model relates to the concepts behind
PP and the SMCT. The computational model is evaluated in
a simplistic simulation, which was specifically designed to
highlight several important aspects of the learning problem
that the agent is facing. In particular, the agent has to deal
with ambiguity in sensorimotor states, a difficulty that will be
described in detail along with a solution.
II. RELATED WORK AND SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
A. Computational Reinforcement Learning
In the last two decades, computational reinforcement learn-
ing has stepped out of the realm of simple simulated grid
worlds, and has entered the real world through physical robots:
many algorithms that are based on the core principles of
reinforcement learning (i.e. iteratively improving a behavior
through trial-and-error learning, maximizing a reward signal)
have been proposed in the robotics literature, and have been
successfully applied to robot skill learning in a range of
experiments [11]. However, a key requirement that enables
the success of any of these algorithms is the definition of a
compact state-space: a re-description of the important aspects
of the actual physical problem, in a low-dimensional and
often highly task-specific abstract vector space. In a way it
can be said that through this definition of a state-space, the
human designer already endows the robot with large amounts
of her or his generic knowledge (and with it, parts of the
solution), before the actual learning has even begun. Naturally,
this significantly simplifies the learning problem. In fact, it
has recently been shown [12] that many of the successes
that we have seen are not due to improvements in learning
algorithms, but much rather due to the way that researchers
have learned to simplify the learning problem so much [13]
that even simple black-box optimization algorithms are able
to successfully solve the problem, and in some cases even
outperform highly sophisticated learning algorithms. While
these approaches have led to robots demonstrating impressive
performance in terms of dexterity and precision, the fact that
they depend on the manual definition of a state-space (i.e.
feature representation of the sensorimotor space) prohibits
their application as generic learning methods, which would
be required for truly autonomous robot learning.
To overcome the necessity for manually designed feature
representations, one might argue that unsupervised learning
and dimensionality reduction methods could be employed, as
it might be possible to discover suitable and generic features
in a data-driven way. The upsurge and success stories of deep
learning methods in the computer vision and machine learning
communities [14] could be taken as arguments in favor of such
a view. And indeed, it has recently been demonstrated that it
is possible to not only learn a policy, but at the same time also
a suitable abstraction from raw sensory inputs, thus tackling
and solving the learning problem “end-to-end” [15], [16]. This
is achieved by extending the reinforcement learning system
with a deep learning component. Through optimization, these
systems are capable to extract a suitable feature representation
that is relevant to the task at hand, thus learning a behavior
while only minimally relying on human task-knowledge. This
is a major step forward from solutions that rely on hand-
specified feature representations. But nonetheless, the same
fundamental problem remains: the information that is encoded
in the system after optimization is highly task-specific, and as
a consequence, the agent still has to learn every new task
almost entirely from scratch.
Another perspective that can be taken on the topic is that
of “transfer learning”, which is concerned with the problem
of how to transfer information from one domain (the source
domain) to another (the target domain), see [17] for an
overview. Ultimately, if it were possible to transfer knowledge
in a generic way between domains and behaviors, this could
be seen as a solution to the problem of how to endow an agent
with generic knowledge. However, the majority of approaches
in the body of literature on transfer learning assume that
the state space of source and target domain are identical
and manually defined in advance. Thus, these approaches do
not directly contribute to answering the question of how an
agent could acquire generic knowledge. Other works assume
different state spaces in source and target domain but either
require a manually defined transfer mapping between these
(still predefined) spaces, or some other form of task-specific
knowledge. There are a few notable exceptions [18], [19], but
they are concerned with the question of how to transfer in-
formation between two tasks that are in some way equivalent,
which is not the case in general.
B. PP and the SMCT
What is still missing in any of the above described systems,
so it seems, is a mechanism to acquire generic knowledge,
which could be leveraged for the learning of new skills. In
the following, relevant aspects of PP and SMCT will briefly
be summarized, with the aim to motivate a choice of learning
algorithm for a cognitive agent.
Predictive processing, in form of the “free energy” principle,
has been proposed as a candidate for a unifying brain theory
[3], [6] and has received much attention in the cognitive
science literature in recent years (see also [8] for a more
thorough discussion of the historical roots of the theory).
The overall idea is that through evolution, brains have de-
veloped into a means of adaptive agents to minimize their
likelihood to encounter harmful situations. To achieve this,
the brain requires the capacity to discover the causes of
sensory observations, in order to allow the agent to generate
adaptive responses. However, it does not have direct access
to information about the true causes, but has to rely solely
on the sensory information that it receives. According to PP,
3the brain deals with this problem by constructing a hierarchical
generative model and performing probabilistic inference about
what are the causes of sensory observations. It thus builds up
an internal model of latent environmental causes, mirroring the
informational structure of the external world. The brain then
operates by producing top-down predictions of future sensory
inputs, and comparing them with actually observed inputs.
This way, it generates prediction errors, which are used to
update the hierarchical predictive model to better match what
is actually observed. This view on the nature of perception
as a process largely driven by top-down signals is in stark
contrast with traditional views of perception as a bottom-up
information processing “pipeline”.
While indirect empirical support for this interpretation of
brain function is accumulating [5], the theory is lacking a clear
description of how the internal model is constructed, and of
the nature of the information that is encoded in the hierarchical
model.
The sensorimotor contingencies theory [9] is another promi-
nent theory of perception in the recent cognitive science litera-
ture, and also constitutes a radical break with traditional views
of perception. According to the theory, perception corresponds
to the “mastery of sensorimotor contingencies” (dynamic in-
teractions of the agent with its environment). An often recited
example that is meant to illustrate this rather vague description
is that of color perception: perceiving something as red, so the
argument, does not correspond to the circumstance that light
of a certain wave-length is impacting the cones on the retina.
Actually, light of the same wave-length can under certain
conditions be reflected off of different surfaces that are actually
perceived as not having the same color. What actually amounts
to the perception of the color red, according to the theory, is
the knowledge of how the incoming stimuli change when the
agent interacts with the environment (for example by moving
the red surface and thus dynamically changing the reflection
of ambient light).
The theory can be interpreted in the following way, which
helps to formulate the concepts the theory provides in a
robotics or machine learning context: An important conse-
quence of the theory is that perception (for example of a
certain color) is not a property of the stimulus, nor is it a
property of the sensor. Instead, perception is said to be a
property of an interaction of the agent with its environment, or
rather of the “mastery” of this interaction, which is a sensori-
motor contingency. In fact, substantially different sensors and
motors could be employed by an agent to engage in the same
sensorimotor contingency, and would thus result in the same
perception [9], [20]. Through its “mastery” of contingencies,
an agent has the means to recognize external reality. It can
engage in the interaction with the environment that is specific
to a contingency, and as long as this interaction succeeds, the
contingency is perceived by the agent. The agent’s knowledge
of contingencies can thus be characterized as strategies, or
policies, to test specific hypotheses about its environment. By
following such a strategy, it can verify the hypothesis that the
contingency is indeed in place, or falsify it by noticing that
the interaction fails.
As compared to PP, the SMCT lacks a clear description of
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Abstract examples of sensorimotor interactions, see text for descrip-
tion.
the underlying processes on the level of neuron activations or
in the form of a mathematical formalization. In particular, it is
not clearly specified what “mastery” means in concrete terms.
On the contrary, SMCT strongly highlights that perception is
intimately coupled with action (hence the name “sensorimotor
contingencies theory”). Furthermore, in contrast to PP, it
makes a distinction about what is perception and what is
not: only contingencies that the agent can itself influence
through its own actions are relevant for it, whereas arbitrary
but recurring patterns of signals, which might occur naturally
but without any possibility for the agent to influence, are
meaningless for the agent and are thus not perceived.
III. A HIERARCHICAL PREDICTIVE MODEL OF
SENSORIMOTOR CONTINGENCIES AS REPRESENTATIONAL
FRAMEWORK
Both PP and the SMCT lack a level of detail that is
sufficient for a comprehensive computational implementation.
While there exist a number of computational models that serve
to demonstrate important properties of the two theories (e.g.
[21]–[23]), none of them addresses the fundamental question
of how a naive agent can autonomously develop the internal
structure that is postulated by the respective theory. But taking
the two theories together, a picture of a cortical system
emerges that moves us closer towards a holistic understanding,
as will now be outlined. The described view will also allow
us to develop a computational model, which will be described
in Section V.
By combining the views of PP and the SMCT, we can
hypothesize that the cognitive system of an agent should
constitute of a hierarchical predictive model that is employed
to predict future sensory signals. In this model, hierarchically
higher levels estimate latent causes for information that is en-
coded on respective lower levels, or said otherwise, hypotheses
about lower-level contingencies.
To make this a bit clearer, consider the abstract example of a
sensorimotor interaction between an agent and its environment
that is depicted in Figure 1a, where the horizontal and vertical
axes correspond to the agent’s motor and sensor spaces,
respectively. When the agent maneuvers through its motor
space (i.e. it translates its motor state left and right along the
horizontal axis), it observes a stable sensory feedback pattern,
which can be plotted as a curve. In this very simple example,
the agent can easily learn a predictive model to capture the
laws of its sensorimotor interaction. There is no reason for
the agent to assume that the environment has a state, which
is different from the agent’s own internal state. Indeed, the
4agent does not even have any reason to assume that there
is any such thing as an environment. From the agent’s point
of view, the whole world seems perfectly deterministic and
completely controllable. Furthermore, there is no point for this
agent to maintain a memory of any sort, such as an internal
state (as opposed to its physical state, i.e. the one of its body).
The agent could perfectly control its sensorimotor apparatus
without having to know anything about the past.
Now consider the case of another agent, whose sensorimotor
interaction with the environment is depicted in Figure 1b.
It has identical motors and sensors as the agent from the
first example, but its situation is substantially different: for
some of the configurations in its motor space, it always
observes a stable sensory feedback, just like the first agent,
but for a subpart of its motor space it observes two different
sensory feedbacks for identical motor configurations. This
second agent faces the problem that was outlined above in the
description of the PP account for cognition (see Section II-B):
the sensory signals that it observes depend on factors that
are external to the agent itself (changes happening in the
agent’s environment), and thus are not controllable by the
agent. Furthermore, the agent has no means to directly measure
the external factors. Were it to make memoryless predictions
of sensory observations (like the first agent), it would perform
at chance level at most. Its only way to improve its capability
to make accurate predictions is by maintaining an internal
representation that somehow estimates the external causes of
sensory observations.
Many formalisms have been introduced in the literature
to address this problem. For example, one common way
(among many others) to include an internal state in a predictive
model is to use a recurrent neural network, which incorporates
temporal information into its predictions. The point here
however is not simply that this is a problem that needs to be
addressed in some way. Instead, this work looks at the bigger
picture: what is the nature of the representational system of
the brain, and how could it be implemented in an artificial
agent? Without a clear connection to a comprehensive theory
of brain organization, it is difficult to see how a computational
model might be extended to a complete cognitive system.
PP and the SMCT offer such a theory of brain organization,
to a sufficient extent. Following the above interpretation of
the theories, we can postulate that the internal representation
of external causes of sensorimotor observations is in the
form of internal states, which encode hypotheses about how
the flow of sensorimotor signals will unfold. Concretely, we
can imagine the agent to store two internal models, each of
which estimates one of the two curves that are plotted in
Figure 1b. By assigning an activation level to each one of these
internal models, the agent becomes equipped with a simple
form of memory and the ability to test its hypotheses about
external causes: the agent can make predictions about how its
sensory input will change in response to changing its motor
state. Sensory observations will lie on either one of the two
curves, which will lead to the corresponding internal model
to be selected. In this view, the agent, after learning, would
not simply make different sensory observations, but it would
perceive two distinct sensorimotor contexts, or contingencies.
It was already demonstrated in the literature that such a
selection mechanism can be implemented (e.g. [10]). This pa-
per addresses the problem of how an agent can autonomously
discover the external state for the training of appropriate
internal models. For the purpose of demonstrating how this
can be achieved, the next section will introduce a mathematical
formalization of the problem description.
IV. MATHEMATICAL FORMALIZATION
We can formally describe the sensorimotor experience of
an agent in the following way: as it explores its sensorimotor
space, for example by following an exploratory control policy
(such as [24]), the agent observes sequences of sensorimotor
states xi. Here, X = {xi} is the set of possible sensorimotor
states and corresponds to extero- as well as interoceptive
signals, which also includes efferent copies of motor signals.
In the examples described above, this set of sensorimotor
states is that of all possible pairs (mi, si) = xi in the two-
dimensional plane that is depicted in Figure 1.
We can describe the experience of the agent, as it follows
an exploration policy pi, as a stochastic process:
Xpi = {Xt = xi : t = 1, . . . , n} . (1)
If we further assume that the set X of sensorimotor states is
countable (it will later be shown how to relax this assumption
to deal with continuous sensorimotor spaces), we can model
the agent’s sensorimotor exploration as a discrete-time Markov
chain X1, X2, . . . , Xn.
In this formulation, the task of the agent to minimize its
error in predicting future states amounts to estimating the
probability
Pr(Xt+1 = xj | Xt = xi, pi, Et = ek), (2)
which describes the probability of observing a transition from
one sensorimotor state, xi, to another, xj , when generating
motor commands according to the policy pi. Additionally, we
let the probability distribution depend on a latent variable ek,
which represents the current “agent-environment configura-
tion”: it summarizes all external factors that influence the out-
come of the agent’s actions. For example, imagine a robot with
a control policy to grasp a bottle: executing this policy will
obviously only have a chance of success if there is a bottle in
reach of the robot in the current situation. As another example,
imagine two identical robots, standing in a corridor in front of
two identical looking doors, one leading to a kitchen, the other
leading to a dining room. The sequence of observations that the
two robots would make when opening and passing through the
respective doors would of course be very different (one would
probably see a fridge, while the other would probably see a
dining table). This environmental influence, or sensorimotor
context, is summarized in an abstract way by the variable ek.
In the above example (Figure 1b), ek could be said to assume
one of two values, corresponding to one of the plotted curves,
respectively.
One might be inclined to think of the variable ek as the
set of all possible states of the entire universe. But this
would of course be entirely misleading: instead, it is helpful
5to conceive of it as the most compact way to encode all
qualitatively different situations the agent can face, given its
sensorimotor apparatus. From this perspective, we can argue
that a sensorimotor contingency corresponds to a property of
the agent’s interaction with the world, when the value of the
latent variable ek is fixed. Taking again the example of object
perception, we could say that a given ek corresponds to an
agent-environment configuration where a certain object is in
front of the agent (as compared to the object for example being
in a certain absolute position in “world coordinates”).
Thus, since ek is a latent variable, the agent cannot easily
estimate the above probability. What it does observe as it
explores its sensorimotor space for a longer period of time
(i.e. for large n) is the marginal probability distribution
Pr(Xt+1 = xj | Xt = xi, pi)
=
∑
ek
Pr(Xt+1 = xj | Xt = xi, pi, Et = ek). (3)
The agent therefore has to demarginalize this observed state
transition distribution by estimating the latent environmental
causes of sensorimotor states.
One way that the agent can estimate the current state ek,
once it has achieved a suitable demarginalization, is by track-
ing the likelihood of the individual models (corresponding to
the individual terms of the sum in Equation 3) over time, that
is, using the models to make predictions and comparing each
prediction with actually observed future states and updating
model likelihoods correspondingly. Importantly, this implies
that the distinguishing property on which the agent relies to
decide whether two sensorimotor states are similar or not is
temporal adjacency: given a high likelihood of an internal
model, corresponding to a hypothesis about a contingency,
the agent assumes that the next observation will also originate
from the same contingency, unless the agent itself disengages
from it. Furthermore, the agent can test whether two sen-
sorimotor states are part of the same contingency by trying
to reach the one state from the other, by means of its own
actions. If the agent can reliably transition between two states
whenever a certain internal model has a high likelihood, it can
safely assume that both states are part of the corresponding
contingency and can update the model accordingly. On the
contrary, if the agent cannot reach some sensorimotor state, it
can be inferred that this state does not belong to the current
contingency.
In the following, we will describe how we can utilize
this property to formulate an algorithm to demarginalize the
transition probability distribution and to discover latent struc-
ture, for an agent to learn predictive models of sensorimotor
contingencies.
A. Contingencies as Clusters of Mutually Reachable States
Equation 3 describes the marginal probability distribution
of state transitions, which an agent observes when following a
policy pi for an extended amount of time. In the discrete case,
this distribution can be captured in a transition probability
matrix Tpi with entries
(Tpi)i,j = Pr(Xt+1 = xj | Xt = xi, pi), (4)
where xi,xj ∈ X .
As argued above, sensorimotor states that belong to the
same contingency share the property that the agent can tran-
sition between the states using its own actions, or in other
words, they are “reachable” from one another for the agent.
In contrast, states that are not reachable in this sense do not
belong to the same sensorimotor contingency.
The task to discover contingencies within the flux of senso-
rimotor states can thus be reformulated as one of finding sets
of sensorimotor states, for which the agent observes a high
probability of transitioning within the set while following its
policy, but observing transitions out of the set only with a low
probability. Note that it is not generally possible to construct
such sets by grouping together sensorimotor states based on
how “similar” they are in sensorimotor space (measured for
example by their Cartesian distance). While a state xi ∈ Xp
might have a low distance to another state xj ∈ X \ Xp, they
can be dissimilar from a reachability point of view: they do
not co-occur in the same contingency (meaning for example
that the agent cannot reach xj from xi using its own actions).
We will see examples for such cases later in the descriptions
of the simulation experiments. A consequence of this property
is that standard clustering methods, such as K-means, will not
find a valuable solution.
When interpreting the transition probability matrix Tpi as an
adjacency matrix for a weighted graph, where nodes represent
sensorimotor states and edges represent transition probabili-
ties, then the task of discovering sensorimotor contingencies
consequently translates into one of finding densely connected
subgraphs within this graph, or said otherwise, finding a
partition that separates graph clusters. A suitable partition
P = {X1,X2, . . . ,Xk} of X (the nodes of the graph) into
k subsets, which satisfies the property of having high intra-
subset transition probabilities and low transition probabilities
in between subsets can be found with the following minimiza-
tion:
argmin
P
∑
Xp∈P
∑
xi∈Xp
xj∈X\Xp
Pr(Xt+1 = xj | Xt = xi, pi) (5)
= argmin
P
∑
Xp∈P
∑
xi∈Xp
xj∈X\Xp
(Tpi)i,j . (6)
Such a partition should constitute a solution to the problem
of the agent of discovering sets of states that correspond to
different latent causes. Thus, given a suitable partition P , the
probability distribution in Equation 2 can be estimated as
Pr(Xt+1 = xj | Xt = xi, pi, Et = ek)
∼ Pr(Xt+1 = xj | Xt = xi, pi,xi ∈ Xk), (7)
V. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
The minimization problem defined in Equation 6 is an
instance of the mincut problem of cutting the transition prob-
ability graph (which has the transition probability matrix Tpi
as its adjacency matrix) in such a way into k components
that the cut-crossing edges have minimal weight. Each of
the components would correspond to sets of sensorimotor
6states with high “inter-reachability”, whereas transitions in
between sets occur less frequently, thus matching the property
of contingencies when viewed from a graph point of view as
described above.
The idea to use graph clustering methods to partition a state
graph has already been suggested in the reinforcement learning
literature [25], [26], but with a different motivation: the aim
of these works is to discover “subgoals”, to speed up learning
convergence in reinforcement learning (see also [27]). The idea
is that “bottlenecks” (such as doorways in a navigation task)
are important subgoals when discovering a policy, and they
can be characterized as state transitions with low probability
between two clusters of densely connected states. Such transi-
tions can be discovered by formulating a similar minimization
problem as the one proposed above. In contrast, here we are
interested in discovering densely connected clusters, which we
interpret as sensorimotor contingencies.
We thus want to solve the mincut problem for the transition
probability graph defined by the matrix Tpi to find a parti-
tion into k components. This can be approximately achieved
through spectral clustering [28], using the method suggested
by Ng and colleagues [29], in the following way.
We first solve the eigenvalue problem for the transition prob-
ability matrix to find the k largest eigenvalues λ1, λ2, . . . , λk
and associated eigenvectors u1, u2, . . . , uk, and form the ma-
trix
U = [u1 u2 . . . uk] ∈ Rm×k (8)
where m = |X | is the number of discrete sensorimotor states
that the agent can observe. The matrix U is then normalized
such that each row has unit length, resulting in the matrix V
with entries
Vi,j =
Ui,j√∑
l U
2
i,l
. (9)
Treating each row in V as a point in Rk, we cluster them
into k clusters using K-means. Since each row in V also
corresponds to a row in the original transition probability
matrix Tpi , and thus to a state x ∈ X , the result of the spectral
clustering provides us with the final partition of X into the k
subsets {X1,X2, . . . ,Xk}. The agent can then use this partition
of states to train multiple internal models, one for each subset
Xi (see Equation 7).
VI. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate the method proposed above, a simplistic simu-
lation scenario was designed with the purpose of highlighting
several important aspects of the learning problem that a naive
agent is facing when learning to interact with its environment.
Consider the situation of an agent (a virtual robot) with a
turnable base and a single laser range sensor, measuring the
distance to the nearest obstacle in a straight line of sight
(see Figures 2a–b). In front of the agent, in the otherwise
empty environment, a movable wall is placed. As the agent
explores its situation by generating motor commands, i.e.
rotating around its base, it makes a sequence of observations.
As long as the wall remains static, these observations all lie
on a one-dimensional manifold in the agent’s two-dimensional
(a) simulated world: wall
translates
(c) sensorimotor space
(b) simulated world: wall
translates and rotates
(d) sensorimotor space
Fig. 2. The simulation scenario that was used in the experiments. (a) In the
first variant, a wall is placed in front of the robot and moves towards and
away from it. Several possible wall positions are indicated in different colors.
(b) In the second variant, the wall also rotates. In (c)–(d) the sensorimotor
space is shown for the two variants, with observed manifolds plotted in color,
corresponding to the shown wall configuration examples.
sensorimotor space. However, in this scenario, the wall is
randomly moved into new positions. As the wall changes
positions, also the manifold in sensorimotor space changes, on
which the observations lie that the agent makes. This can be
seen in Figures 2c–d, which show the agent’s two-dimensional
sensorimotor space (with the motor degree of freedom along
the horizontal axis, and the sensory input along the vertical
axis): for each distinct state of the world (i.e. position and
orientation of the wall), the agent’s observations lie on a
different curve.
In this simulation scenario, the latent environmental state ek
(cf. Equation 2) consists of the degrees of freedom of the wall:
its position and orientation. For each distinct state, the agent’s
exploration results in observations lying on a corresponding
distinct manifold. When considering this process in terms of
the marginal probability distribution described by Equation 3,
each individual state of the environments corresponds to one
of the summands, and thus a distinct distribution.
The agent however only has access to its own sensor and
motor states, whereas the state of the wall is unknown to it. It
also has no information about when the environment changes
states. But the sensory feedback that it receives when exploring
its environment is directly influenced by the state of the
environment. From an external perspective, the observations
made by the agent can be characterized as sequences of
curve segments, a new segment beginning each time when
the environment changes states. However, the agent a priori
7(a) Wall translating, five discrete
positions.
(b) Wall translating, continuous
set of positions.
(c) Wall translating and rotating,
six discrete positions.
Fig. 3. The outcome of the agent’s initial exploration of the sensorimotor space, in three variants of the simulation experiment. Sensorimotor observations
are plotted as gray dots, cluster centroids are shown as red circles.
does not know about the existence of this structure in the
data. It experiences observations distributed in sensorimotor
space, without knowing that they belong to distinct subspaces,
or manifolds. From the agent’s point of view, the samples
are generated from the marginal probability distribution of
sensorimotor state transitions, see Equation 3. When trying
to directly estimate a model of the sample distribution from
all the samples taken together, the agent would thus face the
difficulty of having a large sensory variance associated with
each transition, which in turn would result in a low accuracy
for prediction.
However, as suggested above, the agent can solve this prob-
lem by clustering observations together in terms of how well
it can reach them from one another, as opposed to how similar
they appear (as for example measured by their Cartesian
distance in sensorimotor space), thereby demarginalizing the
probability distribution, allowing the agent to estimate multiple
separate internal models, to account for different latent states.
In a first step, the continuous sensorimotor space of the
agent is discretized in an initial sensorimotor exploration
phase, to construct the set of sensorimotor states X : The
agent generates observations by exploring its motor space and
observing sensory responses, across a timespan long enough
for the environment to visit all of its states. In the experiments,
a Gaussian random walk was used as exploration policy pi
for the agent’s motor outputs while the environment’s state
changed at each time step with a probability of 0.1 (also
performing a Gaussian random walk in its own state space
E = {ei}), thus allowing the agent to explore each constant
state of the environment on average for 10 time steps. K-
means is then applied on the set of observations to obtain a
discretization of the sensorimotor space into r states, resulting
in the set of sensorimotor states X = {xi}, i = 1, . . . , r,
xi = (mi, si)
T . The outcome is plotted in Figures 3a–c for
different versions of the scenario. Subsequently, sensorimotor
observations are classified as one of these states using nearest-
neighbor classification.
The agent then continues to explore its sensorimotor space
for a fixed amount of time and thus observes a sequence of
sensorimotor states. Above it was argued that sensorimotor
contingencies are characterized by sets of states that are
“inter-reachable” for the agent, meaning that it can transform
Fig. 5. Via a permutation of the transition probability matrix Tpi , some of
the underlying structure of the sensorimotor interaction of the agent with its
environment becomes apparent.
any state within the set into any other state from the same
set, with its own actions. The agent thus only requires to
retain information about state transitions: knowledge about
which state transitions are possible is sufficient to derive
which states can be reached from one another. We therefore
remove from the sequence of observed sensorimotor states all
duplicate entries, such that we obtain a sequence of states
(cf. Equation 1) in which each pair of subsequent elements
correspond to an observed state transition:
Xpi = {Xt = xi : t = 1, . . . , n} , s.t. ∀ t : Xt 6= Xt+1.
(10)
Based on these observed state transitions, the transition prob-
ability matrix Tpi is then constructed (cf. Equation 4), where
each row is normalized to sum up to 1 to form a probability
mass function. Spectral clustering is then applied as per the
method presented in Section V to obtain a partition of the set
of sensorimotor states.
In the following, several simulation runs will be presented,
to visualize the result of the learning method, and to point out
properties of the learning problem that a naive agent is facing
when trying to learn sensorimotor contingencies as described
above.
A. Simulation 1: Spectral Transform of Sensorimotor States
Consider first the case of the simulation scenario where the
wall only moves towards and away from the agent into five dis-
tinct states, while its orientation is held constant (see Figure 4
for an overview of the simulation experiment). Figure 5 shows
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Fig. 4. Overview of Simulation 1. (a) The wall moves into five distinct positions, shown in gray. The five distinct configurations can also clearly be seen
in the agent’s sensorimotor space (b), as well as in its spectral projection (c). In the latter, the outcome of the spectral clustering is indicated by the different
colors, showing that (d) the five sensorimotor contexts have correctly been discovered.
(a) simulated world (b) sensorimotor space (c) spectral space (d) sensorimotor contexts
Fig. 6. Overview of Simulation 2. (a) In this variant, the wall moves freely within an interval of possible positions (shown as a gray area). (b) Distinct
manifolds are no longer visible in sensorimotor space, but (c) its projection into spectral space results in a distribution of the sensorimotor states along
a one-dimensional manifold, capturing the one degree-of-freedom of the environment. (d) The spectral clustering successfully captures the structure of the
interaction: discovered sensorimotor contexts match the curvature of the continuum of manifolds.
the transition probability matrix Tpi that was constructed in this
case. We can uncover some of the structure of the interaction
by permuting the rows and columns: Since the generation
of sensorimotor states through K-means does not carry any
information about the topology of the sensorimotor space, the
ordering of rows and columns is initially random. However, for
the purpose of visualization, we can permute them to match
the true topology of the data. This way it becomes easily
visible that each of the states of the wall manifests itself for
the agent as a “cluster” of states between which the agent can
transition with high probability, whereas transitions between
the clusters have a low probability. This can be seen in the
figure as blocks of entries with high values along the diagonal
of the matrix, one for each of the states of the environment.
Note that the fact that some of the sensorimotor states have a
higher probability to be transitioned to, in particular ones lying
close to the left and right limits of the motor space, is due to
the way that cluster centroids were placed in sensorimotor
space by the K-means algorithm: because of the curvature of
the manifolds, the centroids are more “packed” towards the
center of the motor space and more spread apart towards the
ends, rendering it overall more likely for the agent to observe
the centroids lying close to the ends of the motor space.
When interpreting Tpi as an adjacency matrix for a graph,
as suggested above in Section IV-A, each of these blocks
corresponds to a densely connected subgraph within this graph.
Note that the reordering has no effect whatsoever on the result
of the learning method, and is therefore unnecessary. It was
only done here once for the purpose of visualization, and
normally is not part of the learning method.
In the spectral clustering step, the matrix V ∈ Rm×k
is constructed based on an eigenvalue decomposition of the
matrix Tpi , as described in Section V. Each of the k rows in
V corresponds to exactly one sensorimotor state xi, and is
treated as a coordinate in an m-dimensional “spectral space”.
The m dimensions of the spectral space in turn correspond
to the eigenvectors associated to the m strongest eigenvalues
of Tpi . To visualize this mapping of sensorimotor space into
the spectral space, Figure 4c shows a plot of a projection of
the k points into the three-dimensional subspace of the three
strongest eigenvalues: it can be seen that all points lie in one
of five dense clusters. The actual clustering is performed using
K-means in the m-dimensional spectral space, where m is also
the number of clusters to be found.
Selecting the correct number of clusters m of course plays
an important role in the outcome, as in any clustering method.
However, for the purpose of this discussion, the problem of
how to estimate m is not the focus and instead a good value is
manually selected. However it should be noted that methods
9exist to automatically estimate the number of clusters [30]. In
this version of the scenario, it is set to m = 5, to match the
number of discrete positions that the wall is entering. Figure 4d
shows the result of the clustering of the sensorimotor states:
it can be seen that indeed each of the five dense clusters
in spectral space groups together all sensorimotor states that
belong to one of the position of the wall.
B. Simulation 2: The Topology of the Internal State Represen-
tation
We can learn more about the topology of the distribution
of sensorimotor states in spectral space when considering
another variant of the scenario: in this variant, the wall
changes positions in form of a continuous Gaussian random
walk. The latent variable e therefore assumes values from
an interval, instead of only five discrete values as before.
Figure 6 shows an overview of this version of the simulation
experiment. Here it can be seen, that the states are no longer
clearly separated in spectral space, but instead have a curve-
like distribution. Furthermore, as indicated by the color code,
this curve-like distribution can be seen as capturing the one
degree-of-freedom of the environment: Sensorimotor states
that lie at the bottom of sensorimotor space (i.e. states that are
observed when the wall is in the position that is closest to the
agent) have been mapped to the left end of the curve. As we
move rightwards along the curve, the positions of states move
upwards in sensorimotor space, until finally, at the other end of
the curve, all states are gathered that correspond to the topmost
manifold in sensorimotor space (i.e. states that are observed
when the wall is in the position that is farthest away from
the agent). Note that what is shown in the figure is a three-
dimensional projection of a higher-dimensional distribution,
in this case m = 10. Because of the normalization that is
done in Equation 9, the points actually lie on the surface of
an m-dimensional hypersphere.
The result of applying spectral clustering in this case is
shown in Figure 6d. It can be seen that overall, sensorimotor
states that are located close to similar manifolds (i.e. wall
positions) have been clustered together. Note however, that
the top-most clusters are “broken apart” in the center: this is
a result of choosing a larger value for the parameter m in the
K-means step. These clusters that represent curve segments
could be merged together in a subsequent step, to improve the
quality of the result. How and why the agent could do this will
be discussed in the conclusion of this article.
To understand why the sensorimotor points are distributed
in a curve-like way in spectral space, that is, along a one-
dimensional manifold on the surface of the m-dimensional
hypersphere, it is again helpful to think of the matrix Tpi as an
adjacency matrix of a graph. The construction of the spectral
space can then be seen as a means to map out the graph in m-
dimensional space, such that nodes (i.e. sensorimotor states)
that are connected via edges with high weights are placed close
together. Transitions between sensorimotor states with higher
probability can thus be seen as “springs” that pull these states
together in spectral space. In the case of the first simulation,
the result is quite clear: only transitions within one of the
five clusters had relatively high probabilities, and thus the
states of each of the clusters were “pulled together”, effectively
collapsing them into five almost point-like distributions. In
the case of the second simulation however, the situation is a
bit different: Each sensorimotor state can now be observed
not only in a single, but many wall positions. Importantly,
this means that for a given sensorimotor state, the agent will
observe transitions to different other states, depending on the
exact position of the wall (for example when moving left in
motor space, for one wall position it might transition “left
and down” to another state, whereas it might transition ”left
and up” when the wall is slightly farther away). As a result,
similar sets of sensorimotor states are observed by the agent
when the wall is in similar configurations, and thus, they
are arranged closely together in spectral space. On the other
hand, sensorimotor states that only occur in very different
wall configurations are not bound together by high transition
probabilities, and thus are mapped further apart in spectral
space. This behavior results in the generation of the point
distribution that can be seen in Figure 6c.
As a first qualitative result, it can thus be said that through
the presented learning method, a naive agent constructs an
internal representational space (the spectral space), in which
observations happen to be distributed along a one-dimensional
manifold. This one-dimensional manifold happens to corre-
spond nicely to the actual one-dimensional latent state space
e of the environment, even though at no point was any
information about the latent variable put into the learning
system. Furthermore, the internal representational space of
the agent stabilizes the agent’s perception of the world:
instead of trying to directly build up a predictive model
of its sensorimotor interaction, which is difficult because of
large variances in sensory observations as discussed further
above, the agent could first construct the internal space and
subsequently select subsets of observations, based on which it
could train individual predictive models. In a way this allows
the agent to virtually “freeze” the environment, to improve its
learning.
C. Simulation 3: Ambiguity in Sensorimotor States
So far, only simulations have been described in which
the wall changed its position, but not its orientation. What
this means is that when the wall moves, the manifold of
observations in sensorimotor space translated parallel to the
axis corresponding to the sensory input dimension (the vertical
axis in the figures above). This in turn means that every point
in the agents sensorimotor space unambiguously belonged to
exactly one manifold. The agent thus could identify the latent
state of the environment from a single observation, and would
be able to predict what other sensorimotor states to expect:
those lying on the same manifold.
In more technical terms, it can be said that the environment
in the above examples was Markovian: to make an accurate
prediction about the next sensorimotor state, the agent in
principle only has to know the current sensorimotor state.
The assumption about the state distribution being Markovian
is often made in the reinforcement learning literature, but
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(a) simulated world (b) sensorimotor space (c) spectral space (d) sensorimotor contexts
Fig. 7. Overview of Simulation 3. (a) In this variant, the wall not only translates but also rotates, resulting in intersecting manifolds in sensorimotor space
(b). The upper and lower paths of (c)–(d) show the result of the spectral clustering for the cases of clustering observations and transitions, respectively (see
text for details).
cannot be assumed to be true in general. In fact, often a state
space is specifically designed in such a way that it is compact
and casts the problem into a setting in which the Markovian
assumption holds. But of course, this is not possible when the
goal is to develop generic learning mechanisms, where the
task knowledge of the human designer cannot be incorporated
into the learning system.
To see what situation a naive agent is facing when con-
fronted with an environment in which the Markovian assump-
tion does not hold, consider the variant of the simulation
scenario where the wall not only moves, but also rotates
(see Figure 7 for an overview of this third simulation ex-
periment). The key difference to the previous experiments, is
that the manifolds in sensorimotor space are now crossing
(see Figure 7b). At each intersection point, the agent can
now no longer predict what other observations it will make,
based solely on the current observation. The sensorimotor
states at the intersection points are ambiguous, belonging to
multiple distinct contexts. This of course has an important
impact on the transition probabilities that the agent observes:
while transitions along non-intersecting curve segments have
locally Markovian distributions as in the previous simulations,
transitions from intersection points can end in sensorimotor
states lying on any of the intersecting manifolds.
When interpreting the mapping from sensorimotor space to
spectral space again in terms of a graph with “spring-like”
edges, it becomes clear why the above property of senso-
rimotor states lying on intersection points being connected
to other states from multiple manifolds has a strong impact
on the spectral mapping. This can be seen in the top plot of
Figure 7c, which shows again a three-dimensional projection
of the (in this case six-dimensional) spectral space. It can
be seen that states belonging to different contexts are no
longer clearly grouped together in spectral space, nor do they
seem to be organized in a low-dimensional manifold. Instead,
states from different contexts are “pulled together” by the
ambiguous states, resulting in a distribution that – at least
in the three-dimensional projection – appears to be “folded”
in a non-trivial way. The outcome of the K-means clustering
in spectral space, shown in the upper plot in Figure 7d, still
correctly separates sensorimotor states into different contexts.
However, two things have to be noted: Firstly, the clustering
does not always produce the result that is shown here, but
instead sometimes incorrectly combines curve segments from
intersecting manifolds. This, as well, offers the interpretation
that the distribution of sensorimotor states is rather com-
plex, not only in the three-dimensional projection but also
in the actual six-dimensional spectral space. Secondly, the
hard clustering that is produced by K-means of course results
in each sensorimotor state being associated to exactly one
cluster, or context. However, the sensorimotor states that lie
at the intersection point between manifolds should actually be
considered as belonging to both of the intersecting manifolds.
A first step towards resolving these issues is to change the
representation of the agent to the space of transitions between
observations. By doing this, the method described above
no longer clusters together observations, but frequently co-
occurring transitions between observations. A similar strategy
has also been successfully applied for example by Mnih et al.
to disambiguate observations [16]. Minh et al. used sequences
of video frames as input to their reinforcement learning system
instead of single frames, which might be ambiguous.
The overall method remains unchanged, with the only
adaptation being the notion of state: not points in sensorimotor
space, but transitions between points are treated as states. To
make the distinction explicit, a superscript arrow will be used
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in the notation of this new definition of state: X→ = {x→di,j},
where di,j is an index, and the state x→di,j = (xi,xj) cor-
responds to a transition from one K-means cluster, xi, to
another, xj . Consequently, the state transition probability (cf.
Equation 2) becomes
Pr(Xt+1 = x
→
dj,k
| Xt = x→di,j , pi, Et = el), (11)
and entries in the transition probability matrix T→pi become
(T→pi )di,j ,dj,k = Pr(Xt+1 = x
→
dj,k
| Xt = x→di,j , pi). (12)
The lower parts of Figures 7c–d show the outcome of
applying the algorithm when using this new definition of
state. Each point in spectral space in this case represents one
transition between clusters in sensorimotor space. Transitions
within one manifold have again been nicely grouped together,
forming six clearly visible clusters of states that can easily be
separated using K-means.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the impressive progress that has been made in
machine learning research recently, we still do not know how
to efficiently implement the learning of generic knowledge
in artificial agents, such as robots. This article offered as a
perspective on this topic to take inspiration from two recent
developments in the cognitive science literature: predictive
processing approaches to cognition, and the sensorimotor
contingencies theory of perception. More specifically, this
paper is in line with recent works that suggest a combination
of PP and the SMCT [5], [7].
According to PP, the cognitive system of adaptive agents
has to maintain a hierarchical model of the latent causes of
sensory observations. To answer the question of how a naive
agent could autonomously learn about these latent causes, this
article borrowed the concept of sensorimotor contingency from
the SMCT of perception: an agent should try to engage in
predictable sensorimotor interactions with its environment, by
the means of which it perceives sensorimotor contexts (or
contingencies). This idea was formally cast into a computa-
tional model as an instance of the mincut problem on a graph
of sensorimotor state transitions, and spectral clustering was
proposed as a method to solve this problem.
In the proposed model, the agent discovers sensorimotor
contexts as sets of sensorimotor states that, for the agent,
are reachable from one another: if it observes one state and,
after acting, observes another state with high probability, then
the agent can assume that these two states belong to the
same context. It was demonstrated in a series of simulation
experiments that with the proposed method, a naive agent can
successfully discover sensorimotor contexts.
In the presented implementation of the method, the agent’s
knowledge about the discovered sensorimotor contexts was
represented in a very simple way: the set of sensorimotor states
was partitioned, resulting in a description of sensorimotor
contexts in the form of subsets of this set, in conjunction with
a transition probability matrix. As a next step, it would be
possible to train more accurate predictive models for each of
the discovered sensorimotor contexts, to improve the agent’s
capability to predict the flow of sensorimotor observations.
But already in this very simple implementation, the agent can
be said to reduce its overall prediction error: Were it to make
predictions about sensorimotor state transitions directly (i.e.
without first discovering the different sensorimotor contexts),
it would have to base its predictions on the estimate of the
marginal probability distribution (Equation 3). In contrast, as
discussed above, the agent can demarginalize the distribu-
tion via the discovery of sensorimotor contexts, effectively
allowing it to estimate the latent variable e and to make
its predictions under the posterior probability described by
Equation 7. The posterior probability distribution necessarily
has a lower entropy than the marginal probability distribution,
which is equivalent to saying that the agent improves its overall
ability to predict [3].
Two variants for defining the notion of “sensorimotor state”
were used in the simulation experiments: either prototype
points in sensorimotor space (placed using K-means), or
transitions between such prototypes. As long as the space of
sensorimotor observations is unambiguous, the former defini-
tion is suitable for the agent to recognize sensorimotor con-
texts. However, when sensorimotor observations can belong
to more than just a single context, this becomes problematic,
as was demonstrated in the simulation experiments. In that
case, ambiguous observations were arbitrarily assigned to one
context. By implication this means that the agent would always
perceive these observations as belonging to a certain context,
even when they occur within another. It was demonstrated
that this problem could be solved by instead clustering tran-
sitions between prototypes. In that case, the agent would
no longer recognize a sensorimotor context directly via the
set of observations that occur within that context, but via
transitions between observations. Said otherwise, the agent
has to act in order to perceive a context. It should be noted
however that it would still not be strictly necessary for the
agent to act to perceive anything. Instead, when an observation
unambiguously belongs to only one context (i.e. all transitions
from and to this observation belong to the same context), then
there is no reason to assume that the agent would first have
to move to perceive the context or contingency.
In all of the presented simulation experiments, the number
of contexts to be discovered was manually fixed by specifying
the number of clusters that should be found by the spectral
clustering algorithm. Of course this should be done in an
autonomous way instead, which will be addressed in future
work. One possibility would be to use a method to estimate a
suitable number of clusters [30], as suggested above. However,
it may be more natural to approach this difficulty in the scope
of the related question of how a system should construct a rep-
resentational hierarchy, in the following way. Initially, a large
number of clusters could be formed, resulting in a too finely
grained partition of sensorimotor states. But in a subsequent
step, the next level of the representational hierarchy could
be constructed by reapplying the same algorithm, but treating
clusters as “meta-states”: While the agent would continue to
interact with its environment, it would recognize observations
as belonging to a number of the initially discovered contexts,
or meta-states, namely those that together constitute the actual
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manifold in sensorimotor space, on which the observations
are distributed. It would therefore observe transitions between
these contexts to occur with a high probability, comparable
to the high probability of transitions between sensorimotor
states that belong to the same manifold. The same process
of discovering densely connected subgraphs (by construct-
ing a transition probability matrix and applying the spectral
clustering algorithm) could thus be repeated at this stage.
The outcome would be sets of clusters from the initially too
finely grained partition of sensorimotor states. As such, it
seems like it might not be necessary to introduce a further
mechanism for estimating a suitable number of clusters at each
hierarchical level – the method, when repeated across levels of
a hierarchy, could be seen as a hierarchical clustering method
that iteratively combines more and more clusters.
Another direction of future work is to explore how the
presented method can be utilized in the context of rein-
forcement learning. What the agent discovers is a compact
representation of latent states of the environment, which might
be used as feature representation. Indeed, it has been shown
by Mahadevan and Maggioni that a spectral transformation
similar to the one used in this paper can be used for the
construction of a basis, to estimate a value function [31].
Finally, the role of the exploration policy in the discovery
of sensorimotor contexts, or contingencies, should be investi-
gated. In this work, the agent relied on a simple random walk
as exploration policy, which, while sufficient, certainly is a
sub-optimal way to gather information about the sensorimotor
interaction and the environment. A more directed search strat-
egy could certainly speed up the learning process significantly.
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